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- DoD CIP Program
  - Strategy & Current Efforts
- Information Sharing @ installation level




- Defining what is critical
  - Understanding criticality depends upon a broad, DoD-wide understanding of essential sector functions & dependencies
- Protecting what is critical
  - Protection decisions are in hands of asset and installations owners
  - Risk acceptance decisions affect all stakeholders




- Risk acceptance decisions (cont)
  - Most asset owners don't have right information or tools to make optimum vulnerability remediation decisions


The "Horizontal Challenges of the 21st Century" and effective CIP requires integration of individual infrastructure protection strategies
















- DoD installations are the:
  - Primary interface with host nation, federal, state, and local law enforcement, emergency services personnel, and commercial infrastructure providers



- DoD installations are the (cont):
  - First to identify and respond to infrastructure incidents
  - The action agents for correcting vulnerability problems



 Purpose: to develop a concept of operations approach and action plan for information sharing between DOD installations, state and local authorities, and the private sector on critical infrastructure protection

- Requirements:
  - Make maximum use of existing channels for information exchange



- Requirements (cont):
  - Recognize substantive differences between and within DOD components
  - Support information exchange at higher levels of the national command authority
  - Minimize added burden on the installation commander



- Multiple overlapping assessments -
  - concern that the current way of doing assessments is burdensome.
    - The challenge is to provide a single, integrated assessment that considers physical/cyber concerns both inside the fence and in the general community.



- Installations regularly share information with their local providers.
- Installations do not share <u>classified</u> information with infrastructure providers.



 Installation staffs communicate with infrastructure providers on a near continuous basis. Police, fire and emergency services also have frequent interaction. The above encourages a high degree of trust among all parties.



- Y2K efforts lay a substantial foundation for installation-level CIP planning that is being capitalized on.
- Additional education is required, especially as installations become more open and have a larger DOD civilian population. Installation commanders need CIP as part of their training.



- Frequently assessment information receives limited distribution
- Often no prioritized remediation recommendations are provided to the commander as to how to eliminate single points of failure that will adversely affect the installation's mission



- Installation commander does not own or control many of these critical assets
- Ability to use or share this information is often limited because it is frequently contained in a classified document



- Multiple and overlapping assessments are done
- May need to treat infrastructure decisions on a regional or statewide basis